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Fictional Claims
Stephen Pender
Guillermo Sierra Catalán’s rich, engaging paper, “Acquisition of Knowledge through Narrative
...,” opens up a world of suasion and supposition, verisimilitude and verity, and does so adeptly,
using the tools and concepts of contemporary argumentation theory.  He makes a strong case for
the ways in which fictional narratives function as reasons and arguments, arouse passion and
action, and enlist even as they test a whole array of inferential capacities.  But is narrative fiction
— or fiction in general — in any sense a kind of proof? do forms of argument, of proof-making,
borrow means and method from narrative, fictive or non-fictive?   Sierra Catalán’s answers turn1
on whether or not we share his view that narrative fiction a form of testimony, a term that derives
from testimonium, testis or ‘witness,’ and -monium, cousin to -ment in English, denoting an
instrument of action (OED, s.v.).  To ‘bear witness,’ tesâri, is to attest, to offer attestation, to
‘test’ in the sense of attempt, prove, essay.  Testimony is a form of proof (see, for example,
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 5.11.36ff.) and, since Aristotle, proof is the heart of rhetoric. 
With its focus on addressees, Sierra Catalán makes room for quotidian, everyday
testimony — “a pure first-rate kind of knowledge” to which we appeal frequently and persistently
(pp. 1-2) — as a form of epistemology alongside perception and memory, induction and
introspection.  This kind of evidence he terms “natural” as opposed to legal, formal testimony (p.
2).  Both are concerned with content, with information conveyed via address, and thus
testimony’s natural home is the actual, the verifiable, the probable.  Fiction, I would argue, is
nestled, somewhat uncomfortably, between “daily life circumstances” and the severity of a law
court — the alembic of testimony before it migrated into early science.   Sierra Catalán concedes2
this point, but does so by claiming that, for it to achieve “equivalence” with testimony, narrative
fiction must simply convey information (p. 2).  There seems to me a feint here, for Sierra Catalán
claims that fiction can offer knowledge but nothing about its epistemic capacity is “specifically
fictional” (p. 2); in other words, as knowledge-producing discourse, fiction courts the same value
as any kind of testimony, including non-fiction.  In this argument, fiction’s ‘making strange,’ its
ostrenanie, its language and narrative forms, its “representational means,” are either redundant or
insipid, superfluous or wan.  In order to press fiction into epistemic service it must be denuded
and re-naturalised.  Late in the essay, Sierra Catalán attempts a recovery by arguing that, because
of its connative and aesthetic dimensions or “merits,” a “literary narrative a source of more
pieces of knowledge than a non-literary one” (p. 10, my emphasis).  More is more, then: but what
precisely are the epistemic effects of these ‘merits’?  To this question, Sierra Catalán answers
‘imagination,’ phantasia, a notoriously antinomian faculty, which functions powerfully but
fallibly, at least in the intellectual history I study.
I am aware of the long-standing, and ongoing, philosophical debates about these1
questions, spurred by David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15
(1978), pp. 37-46.  Replies to his paper are legion.  My purpose here is to briefly inquire into the
relationships between rhetoric and proof, fiction and narrative.
See Barbara J. Shapiro, “Testimony in Seventeenth-Century English Natural Philosophy:2
Legal Origins and Early Development,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (2002),
pp. 243-263.
Early on in his robust argument, Sierra Catalán avers that “the point of fiction is to
imagine, that is, to know (or pretend to know, or act as if one is knowing) certain things about a
possible world, different from the real one.  So, it is reasonable to understand fiction narrative (a
narrative about a possible world) as the representation of a narrative about the real world — that
is, the representation of testimony. ... [I have] shown that the epistemic values associated with
testimonies — non-fiction narratives — and representations of testimonies — fiction narratives
— coincide” (p. 3, slightly amended).  This ‘coincidence’ of fictive and non-fictive narratives is
founded on the “reliability” of the text or discourse: Sierra Catalán relies on the “commonly
accepted assumption that the more correct a claim is, the more accurate is the representation of
the world it offers and, consequently, the more knowledge about the real world it generates” (pp.
4-5, 8, 9).  This sleight riles: fiction only has a claim on the world insofar as it is “accurate.” 
Accuracy trumps plausibility, verisimilitude, even fantasy?  The claim neuters itself, and is
further diminished by Sierra Catalán’s reliance on the notion of “internal coherence,” borrowed
from Walter Fisher, that fails to illuminate any one of a number of famous avant garde or
‘experimental’ narrative or quasi-narrative works of fiction (pp. 6-7).  One might quibble, too,
that much contemporary, especially popular, fiction has little truck with accuracy, especially
when it comes to the filigree complexity of feeling, or to building equitable fictive spaces for
negotiating ethical strictures with the fustian, messy, sometimes amoral behaviour of its
characters or of actual people.  One might point to E. L. James’s Fifty Shades of Grey for only
the most famous recent example (it withers on every single page, and miscarries spectacularly to
offer anything like ‘accuracy’); and I certainly would not take Brendan Behan’s Borstal Boy
(1958), as brilliant as it is, as a spur to action or a model of practice, even for a ‘possible world.’ 
The rebarbative satire of the eighteenth century evidences the relationship between history and
style: but what have we to learn about ‘possible worlds’ from Alexander Pope’s highly redacted
burlesques of forgotten members of parliament?  Christopher Hill reports that a translation of
Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667, 1674) was one of the most popular books amongst the peasant
soldiers in the tsar’s armies during the Russo-Japanese war, 1905-1906.   What can one make of3
that?  Assertions about what and how fiction and popular fiction are consumed are necessarily
vexed, provisional, as Q. D. Leavis’ Fiction and the Reading Public (1932) demonstrated almost
a hundred years ago.  
Sierra Catalán quotes Garcia-Carpintero to the effect that ‘communicative intention’ aims
to “put an intended audience in a position to make believe (imagine) ... [a] proposition” (p. 3). 
What is such a ‘position’?  To my mind, it stipulates two conditions: the possibility of enargeia,
or vividly presenting one’s subject matter, and the notion that a single mental faculty is devoted
to evaluating both the true and the verisimilar.  Both notions are Aristotelian in origin, but were
taken up with verve by his Roman followers and by countless early modern theorists of poetry,
fiction, narrative, the sermon.  Enargeia and its cognate terms, illustratio, hypotyposis,
repraesentatio, and evidentia, denote vividness of description, so that a subject, a narrative, an
argument appear to unfold, actively, before-the-eyes, of an audience or a judge.  As Quintilian
put it, using the trope enargeia “makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual
scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual
“Milton and the English Revolution,” in Perspectives on Literature and Society in3
Eastern and Western Europe, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking and George F. Cushing (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), p. 23.
occurrence” (6.2.32; cf. 8.3.61).  Often confused with energeia in early modern discourse,
enargeia enables a rhetor to make the absent present, the present estranged — which is in fact a
common definition of rhetoric itself.  Francis Bacon’s conception of the discipline, for example,
rests on its relationship to images received by the senses or conjured by the imagination: “the end
of rhetoric is to fill the imagination with observations and images, to second reason, and not to
oppress it” (Works, 4.455-456).  The subject of rhetoric is “Imaginative or Insinuative Reason”
(3.383).  Precisely this capacity is one of the stipulations of Sierra Catalán’s position.  It is not
new.
The other substratum that undergirds his argument is, I think, the relationship between
truth and fiction, rhetoric and proof — in fact he mentions rhetoric and “rhetorical devices” (p.
7).  ‘Artistic method,’ technique, is concerned with proof, as Aristotle writes: since
demonstration in the mutable, suasive world, in which ‘things might be otherwise,’ is, in part,
enthymemic, the most adept at persuasion are those who are “best able to see from what
materials, and how, a syllogism arises.”  But there is a caveat: this holds true only “if he grasps
what sort of things an enthymeme is concerned with and what differences it has from a logical
syllogism.”  Why?  It “belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and what resembles the
true, and at the same time humans have a natural disposition for the true and to a large extent hit
on the truth: thus an ability to aim at commonly held opinions [endoxa; see Topics, 1.1, pp.
263ff. in Kennedy] is a characteristic of one who also has a similar ability in regard to the truth”
[1355a3ff., pp. 33-34 K].  Truth and fiction share a home.  This ability or capacity is similar to
the faculty of those who can ‘see’ (the term is close to ‘imagine’ and to ‘theorise’) to make
resonant metaphors: such figures ‘strike’ people, surprise them, and bring things “more
intimately before our eyes” (Rhetoric, 1404a10-12, 1405a37-b10).  To know or pretend to know
by imagining depends on a rhetorical capacity, on the ability to winnow or to confect the true
from the verisimilar, on making and remaking images: “the greatest thing by far is to be a master
of metaphor.  It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius,
since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars” (Poetics,
1457b7ff., 1459a5-8).  A figure that arouses emotion, vividly, that makes the absent present, that
redescribes the familiar, is fiction’s claim to knowledge or at least to means for inferring,
inducing, and securing knowledge.
But there is another way of envisioning this contention.  In a series of lectures delivered
in 1995, the historican Carlo Ginzburg reasserted the central of both proof and narrative to
historical inquiry.  ‘Narrative history,’ he insists, underwrites “every form of historical research
and writing,” shifting our attention in order to “explore the mutual interaction between empirical
data and narrative constraints within the process of research itself.  Many years ago,” he
continues, “Lucien Febvre remarked that historical evidence speaks only if properly addressed.” 
This form of address — and Sierra Catalán is concerned with address — means recognising that
narratives mediate and shape, structure and disclose questions asked of evidence as well as the
ways in which evidence is collected, discarded, interpreted, and written.  These, of course, are
questions of proof, at the “fundamental core” not only of historical inquiry but of rhetoric. 
Narrative gives shape to argument, one might claim, for “narrative models” intervene “at every
stage of research, creating both roadblocks and possibilities.”  Such constructions, narrative
constructions, are far from incompatible with proof or, as Ginzburg insists, with desire and
imagination, “without which there is no research.”   Sierra Catalán’s argument inverted, then:4
non-fiction must use one of the tools of fiction to organise, substantiate, represent its claims.
Sierra Catalán is right to focus on inference and imagination as sustaining both reasons
and arguments, particularly in fictive, narrative discourse, but I would add additional capacities:
we infer and build, find satisfying and frustrating, the possible worlds that fiction and non-
fiction, and the shifting boundaries between them, hold on offer.  Our reasonings in response to a
text’s arguments are not only provisional, intensified, modified, or jettisoned as we proceed. 
They are also free.  As Sartre wrote in 1949, all literary work is an “appeal” to the freedom of
readers to collaborate in the production of the text.  That production is uneven because, for the
reader, “all is to do and all is already done; the work exists only at the exact level of his
capacities; while he reads and creates, he knows that he can always go further in his reading, can
always create more profoundly, and thus the work seems to him as inexhaustible and opaque as
things.”  Sartre insists on a “pact” of generosity and trust between writers and readers, disclosed
by the “dialectical going-and-coming” that is reading itself, its mooted expectations and demands
by both figures, at “the highest pitch.”  This appeal is ethical: “my freedom, by revealing itself,
reveals the freedom of the other.”  If fiction speaks to possible worlds, as it must, if fiction is
moored to questions of probability, even fidelity and accuracy, is it often is, these worlds entail
not only freedom, but a form of moral commitment:  “You are perfectly free to leave that book
on the table.  But if you open it, you assume responsibility for it.”   I return, then, this form of5
basic knowledge, to use his terms, and of commitment and responsibility, to use Sartre’s, to
Guillermo Sierra Catalán.
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